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Abstract: This commentary focuses on three issues raised by Gigerenzer,
Todd, and the ABC Research Group (1999). First, I stress the need for fur-
ther experimental evidence to determine which heuristics people use in
cognitive judgment tasks. Second, I question the scope of cognitive mod-
els based on simple heuristics, arguing that many aspects of cognition are
too sophisticated to be modeled in this way. Third, I note the comple-
mentary role that rational explanation can play to Gigenerenzer et al.’s
“ecological” analysis of why heuristics succeed.
Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Research Group have provided a
series of impressive demonstrations of how simple “fast and fru-
gal” cognitive heuristics can attain surprisingly impressive levels
of performance, comparable to human performance in a range of
tasks. They show, for example, that decision making based on a sin-
gle piece of evidence, rather than integrating across all available
evidence, can lead to close optimal performance in a wide range
of estimation tasks (Gigerenzer et al. 1999, Ch. 4, p. 75, Gigeren-
zer & Goldstein). Gigerenzer et al. interpret these results as hav-
ing radical implications for cognition in general – in particular, as
undercutting the view that cognition must involve well-optimized
cognitive machinery which behaves in accordance with classical
rational norms of probability theory, logic, and decision theory.
This line of thought raises the attractive possibility that the com-
plexity of the mind may have been dramatically overestimated.
Perhaps the mind is really just a collection of smart heuristics,
rather than a fantastically powerful computing machine. This is an
exciting and important thesis. This commentary focuses on three
challenges to this approach, which may open up avenues for fu-
ture research.
1. Empirical evidence. Gigerenzer et al. focus on providing a
feasibility proof for the viability of a particular kind of simple rea-
soning heuristic. This task primarily involves providing computer
simulations showing that simple heuristics give good results on
specific decision problems, in comparison to conventional meth-
ods such as linear regression, and to other heuristic approaches,
such as unit-weighted regression. But there is little by way of ex-
perimental evidence that people actually do reason in this way,
aside from important but preliminary evidence reported in Chap-
ter 7. This is particularly important precisely because the simula-
tions in this book show that a wide range of algorithms give very
similar levels of performance. Hence, prima facie, all these algo-
rithms are equally plausible candidates as models of how people
might perform on these problems.
In the absence of a broader set of experimental tests there is
some reason to doubt that people make decisions by relying on
one cue only. As Gigerenzer et al. note, in perception and lan-
guage processing there is ample evidence that multiple cues are
integrated in recognition and classification, in extremely complex
ways (e.g., Massaro 1987). Gigerenzer et al. propose that these
cases are in sharp contrast to the operation of conscious decision-
making processes – determining whether this divide is a real one
is an important area for empirical research.
2. Scope. One of the most startling findings in psychology is
that, across a very wide range of judgment tasks, including med-
ical diagnosis, expert performance does not exceed, and is fre-
quently poorer than, results obtained by linear regression over sets
of features of the cases under consideration (Meehl 1954; Sawyer
1966).
An equally startling finding, this time from artificial intelligence
and cognitive science, has been that in everyday reasoning, peo-
ple vastly outperform any existing computational model (Oaksford
& Chater 1998a). Even the inferences involved in understanding
a simple story draw on arbitrarily large amounts of world knowl-
edge, and people must integrate and apply that knowledge highly
effectively and rapidly. Attempts to model such processes compu-
tationally have become mired in the nest of difficulties known as
the “frame problem” (Pylyshyn 1987).
So cognition is, in some regards, remarkably weak; and in other
regards it is remarkably powerful. In the present context, the cru-
cial point is that the simple heuristics discussed in this book are
aimed at modeling areas where cognition is weak – indeed, where
cognitive performance is already known to be frequently outper-
formed by linear regression. But it is by no means clear that the
picture of the mind as a set of simple heuristics will generalize to
everyday reasoning, where cognitive performance appears to be
remarkably strong. Indeed, it may be that it is not that simple
heuristics make us smart (as Gigerenzer et al.’s title suggests);
rather it may be that we resort to simple heuristics to do the very
thing we are not smart at.
3. Why do heuristics work? Gigerenzer et al. downplay the im-
portance of traditional conceptions of rationality in their discus-
sion of reasoning methods. Indeed, they note that a heuristic such
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as Take the Best has not been derived from “rational” principles
of probability or statistics. Instead, they focus on an ecological no-
tion of rationality – does the heuristic work in practice on real
world data?
The viewpoint may appear to be an alternative to more tradi-
tional notions of rationality as used in psychology (Anderson 1990;
Chater et al. 1999; Oaksford & Chater 1998b), economics (Kreps
1990) and behavioral ecology (McFarland & Houston 1981), in
which behavior is assumed to approximate, to some degree, the
dictates of rational theories, such as probability and decision the-
ory. But it may be more appropriate to see the two viewpoints as
complementary. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) are concerned to demon-
strate rigorously which particular heuristics are successful, by
computer simulation on realistic data sets. Traditional rational the-
ories aim to explain why heuristics work. They characterize the
optimization problem that the cognitive process, economic actor
or animal faces; using rational theories (probability, decision the-
ory, operations research) to determine the “rational” course of ac-
tion; and conjecture that the heuristics used in actual performance
approximate this rational standard to some degree. From this
point of view, rational methods can be viewed as compatible with
the “ecological” view of rationality outlined in Gigerenzer et al.
(1999). Focusing on simple cognitive heuristics does not make the
application of rational standards derived from formal calculi un-
necessary. Instead, it gives a defined role for rational explanation
– to explain why and under what conditions those heuristics suc-
ceed in the environment. This perspective is, indeed, exemplified
in Gigerenzer et al.’s formal analysis of the conditions under which
the Take the Best heuristic is effective (Ch. 6) and consistent with
Gigerenzer et al.’s valuable comparisons between Take the Best
and Bayesian algorithms (Ch. 8).
This book shows an important direction for research on human
reasoning. It should act as a stimulus for empirical, computational,
and theoretical developments in this area.
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